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Abstract:
This paper focuses on the following issues. First, it is concerned with a problem of
pricing auto-parts that are exchanged between the automaker and its parts-suppliers
within the kigyo keiretsu group. Second, it illustrates how these prices should be set in
order to induce each parts-supplier to maximize its profit as a whole. Third, we test
whether the kigyo keiretsu system is a stable quasi-vertical organization. If so, what is
the optimal level of holding parts-suppliers’ shares by the automaker in order to
maximize parts-suppliers’ total sales and profits?
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．Introduction
The structure of the Japanese automobile manufacturing industry is a set of pyramids, with the
product flows from the bottom to the top. Automakers, such as Toyota, Nissan, and Honda are at
the top of each of their pyramids.＊2 The parts for each automaker are supplied by its affiliated
group member firms, and primary independent parts-suppliers. Above all, a conspicuous feature
of the Japanese automobile manufacturing industry in Japan is that Japanese firms are less
vertically integrated than their American counterparts. Rather than adopt fully vertical
integration, a Japanese automaker surrounds itself with a group of parts-suppliers that are bound
to the automaker through shareholdings, exchange of directorates or management, and
technological and financial assistance. These parts-suppliers in a kigyo keiretsu group tend to be
vertically related in the production chain and produce most of their parts for their respective
automaker or other firms within the group.     
This paper focuses on the following issues. First, it is concerned with problem of pricing auto-
parts that are exchanged between the automaker and its parts-suppliers within the kigyo keiretsu
group.＊3 Second, it illustrates how these prices should be set in order to induce to each parts-
supplier to maximize its profit as a whole. Third, we test whether the kigyo keiretsu system is a
stable quasi-vertical organization. If so, what is the optimal level of holding parts-suppliers’ shares
by the automaker in order to maximize parts-suppliers’ total sales and profits?  
．Characteristics of the Kigyo Keirestu System in the Japanese Automobile
Manufacturing Industry
There are several distinguishing features to the Japanese automobile manufacturing industry.
First, most of the parts and sub-assemblies are purchased from “external” suppliers under long-
term contracting arrangements. According to some studies, comparing the US and Japanese
automobile industries, US manufacturers, including their fully-owned subsidiaries, produce about
45 % of the purchased value attributable to outside suppliers. In contrast, Japanese auto
manufacturers and their fully owned subsidiaries contribute only 25 % of the final product’s
market value as the in-house production (Aoki, 1986). Second, a substantial proportion of these
external subsidiaries is closely affiliated with the main automakers in the name of buhin-
kyoryokukai, or corporate association. For instance, In the mid-90s, Toyota Motors organizes
three associations, named Tokai Kyohokai, Kanto Kyohokai, and Kansai Kyohokai,＊4 on a regional
basis. Nissan used to organize Takarakai and Shohokai.＊5 In addition, the automakers tend to
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purchase parts and components from firms which are members of respective kigyo keiretsu
group. According to Asanuma (1992), Toyota purchased about 90 % (by monetary value) from the
Kyohokai member firms in 1986. In 1983, Nissan bought about 90 % from the member firms in
Takarakai and Shohokai. The term, “kigyo keiretsu” refers to the vertical arrangement wherein a
major manufacturer surrounds itself with a group of suppliers bound together by a set of long-
term buyer-supplier’s agreements.＊6 Third, each major manufacturer tends to deal with a small
number of parts suppliers per parts purchased, and is usually dealing with two to three parts
suppliers per unit of parts (Itami, 1988 and Fair Trade Commission, 1993).
In the automobile manufacturing industry, these limited numbers of suppliers provide the auto-
assembler with variety of parts, such as engines, carburetors, transmissions, steering components,
clutches, axles, wheels and electrical components (See Table 1). Except other parts, such as
standardized parts or raw materials, the Japanese automakers deal with two to three parts-
suppliers per parts.
Table 1. Number of Parts-Suppliers per Parts
Data Source: IRC 1987. “Jidosha Buhin 160 Hinmoku No Seisan Ryutsu Chosa,” English translation:
Survey of Product Distributions of 160 Auto Parts.
The firm that belongs to the manufacturing kigyo keiretsu group clearly and openly identifies
itself as a member of the group; for instance, Toyota group, Nissan group, Honda group, and so
on. Membership in a group usually excludes membership in any other groups if suppliers in the
group produce highly specific parts, such as engines, and body-assemblies. However, not all parts’
manufacturers belong to a group, and these firms clearly identify themselves as “independent”
firms. 
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A typical parts-supplier in one of the major kigyo keiretsu group sells most of its products to
either the principal automaker or other firms in the same group. Although the group member
firm is not precluded from selling to other firms outside the group, selling to its main competitor
is rare. For instance, the parts-suppliers in the Nissan group rarely deal with Toyota. Usually,
outside sales are independent parts-suppliers or to one of the secondary automakers, such as
Honda, Mazda, and Mitsubishi. In return, firms in one of the secondary groups also sell their parts
to the dominant groups, such as Toyota and Nissan. For instance, Keihin Seiki Mfg. Co., Ltd.,
joining the Honda group, sells carburetors, injectors, and engine valves to Nissan. In this sense,
firms in the secondary group are not tightly linked with their respective parent automaker.
However, this helped these parts-suppliers in a secondary automaker group to obtain
technological “know-how” and skills in developing parts in cooperation with these two dominant
automakers. In contrast, independent parts-suppliers sell all types of buyers, irrespective of group
affiliation. These suppliers are quite heterogeneous. While some suppliers produce standardized
parts such as tires, batteries, and raw materials, others produce more specialized products, such
as brakes, piston rings, gaskets, shock absorbers and oil pumps.
The kigyo keiretsu is also characterized by interfirm holdings of stock. Namely, Toyota holds
shares of every supplier within its group. The major suppliers in Toyota group often hold shares
in the secondary parts-suppliers, or the second layer of their parts-suppliers in the group. This
generates sub-subcontractors. Interfirm shareholding tends to be asymmetric in the sense that
the smaller suppliers rarely hold shares of the parent automaker, although it can happen that the
largest suppliers in the kigyo keiretsu group are corporate shareholders of the parent automaker.＊7
Another aspect of the kigyo keiretsu structure is that intergroup holdings of common stock are
virtually non-existent. This, of course, reflects the fact that group membership tends to be
mutually exclusive. Interfirm shareholding between independent suppliers and firms in a kigyo
keiretsu is quite common. For example, Nissan, Toyota, and Bendix respectively hold 15.1%, 14.9%,
and 14.8% of an independent parts-supplier, Akebono Brake Industry in 1987.
The parent automaker tends to maintain close contact with the leaders of it member firms. The
presidents of the various companies have regular meetings. Often the boards of directors of the
leading firms in the group are interlocked wherein director of one company sits on the boards of
others. There are exchanges of top executives and managers between the automaker and its
member firms in the group. In manufacturing, the engineers are also exchanged among group
member firms as technological assistants or consultants. This implies that technological innovation
and “know-how” are disseminated within the group as a way of encouraging each parts-supplier to
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cut costs and improve efficiency. This appears to benefit the automakers. One of the benefits is
that dissemination of technological innovation and “know-how” within a kigyo keiretsu group
serves to reduce the parent firm’s costs of switching suppliers.＊8 Another benefit is that better
communication between the automaker and its suppliers in the kigyo keiretsu group reduces the
monitoring costs as well as other transaction costs. Moreover, closing the gap of asymmetric
information between the buyer and the seller appears to help the automakers to mitigate
opportunism by the parts-suppliers in its group.＊9
The quasi-vertically integrated group system, so-called, the kigyo keiretsu system works like an
inter-market-pricing system.＊10 Therefore, we have applied a transfer-pricing model to such
Japanese kigyo keiretsu system; namely, transfer-pricing models with technologically independent
and dependent cases are developed.＊11 In the following section, we first overview the Hirshleifer’s
transfer-pricing model and extend his model to analyze how the parts-suppliers charge their
prices of parts to the automaker in a kigyo keiretsu group.
．Basic Models
1. Overview of the Hirshleifer’s Transfer Pricing Model＊12
Assume that the units of the final product can be expressed in units of the intermediate
product. More specifically, one automobile corresponds to one carburetor or one radiator in this
case. The determination of the joint level of output is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1
The curves respectively denoted as mcc and mac represent the marginal cost of producing the
carburetor and of the automobile. Given this information, Hirshleifer’s proposed solution is for the
parts-supplier to produce OC units of carburetors. OE units of carburetors are sold to the parent
firm and EC units to the external market. The automaker produces OE units of automobiles, and
hence requires OE units of carburetors from its subsidiary.
The optimal transfer-price of carburetor is the market price, r, that is, r = mcc. Under the
technological independence, the automaker will produce its automobiles up to the point where  p
= mac + mcc. The sum of the marginal costs embodies the assumption that the operating costs
are independent.
In the following discussion, imperfectly competitive intermediate market is assumed. First,
consider the auto-manufacturing firm. For each of automobile it sells, the revenue is given by MR.
The extra cost it occurs is the sum of its own mac plus that of the carburetor, mcc. The reason
for regarding total manufacturing costs as the sum, mac + mcc, is the assumption of technological
independence wherein the operating costs of each firm are independent of the level of operations
being carried on by the other.
In Figure 2, the “net marginal revenue” curve (denoted as nMR) is obtained by subtracting mac
from MR; that is, nMR = MR－mac. The net marginal revenue, nMR, shows the amount that the
automaker is willing to pay for each successive carburetor. Hence, nMR represents the
automaker’s demand curve for its auto-parts. 
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Figure 2
Next consider the auto-parts-supplier. In Figure 3, Hirshleifer argues that parts-supplier must
be instructed to take the nMR curve as given, and not to use the curve marginal to it. This is to
prevent monopolistic exploitation by the parts-supplier. Hirshleifer’s solution is to horizontal sum
of mr and nMR.to get Σmr. The parts-supplier then produces up to the point where Σmr = mcc.
The transfer price is t = OA whereas the price charged to external buyer is r = OB. Total parts
output is OR, which consists of OM units to external buyers and OG units to the parent
automaker. Note that the parts-supplier’s behavior is analogous to discriminating monopolist. Note
also that if OG units of carburetors are sold to the automaker at the transfer price OA = mcc,
then, as is in Figure 2, the automaker produces OG units of automobiles where GE + EC = MR
but GE = mcc and EC = mac. Therefore, Hirshleifer’s solution implies that the automaker
produces up to the point, MR = mac + mcc, which, we see, is precisely the condition for the
profit-maximization. This verifies that the profit-maximizing-transfer-price should be equal to mcc.
Hirshleifer’s analysis, thus, tells us that for a vertically integrated firm, the optimal transfer-
price for the intermediate product should be its marginal cost. Then both the final assembler and
its subsidiary will maximize their profits. This is equivalent to maximizing joint profits of
vertically integrated firm. More specifically, if c(qa+qc) and z(qa) are cost functions of producing
parts and of producing automobiles, respectively, then we obtain the following equation:
Max p(qa)qa + r(qc)qc－z(qc)－c(qa+qc) : (1)
qa, qc
Naoki Tabeta
64
Figure 3
Where qa and qc are quantities of automobiles and of carburetors sold to the parent firm. The first
order conditions are obtained as:
MR (qa)－mac(qc) = mcc(qa+qc): (2)
mr(qc)                = mcc(qa+qc): (3)
As is shown in Figure 4, the parts-supplier charges the price of parts to the parent firm, t, and
r to the external market (non-kigyo-keiretsu-member firm). 
2. Extension of the Hirshleifer’s Transfer-pricing Model
In the following two cases, the joint profit-maximization of quasi-vertically integrated firms is
implicitly assumed.
A. Case of Technologically Independent Parts-supplier:
Suppose that the degree of vertical ownership, λ, is measured as the percentage of stock
ownership of parts-supplier by the parent firm,＊13 and that administrative or monitoring cost is
described as A(λ). Since the administrative cost becomes larger as the firm grows larger.
Namely, the firm size is large enough to show diseconomies of scale due to x-inefficiency), 
A′< (λ) < 0, and A″(λ) > 0 are assumed.＊14 Then we have to solve the following equations:
max p(qa)qa－z(qa) + λ｛r(qc)qc- c(qa+qc)｝－A(λ)  : (4)
qa, qc
The first order conditions are obtained as:
MR (qa)－mac(qa)－λmcc(qa+qc)= 0: (5)
λ｛mr(qc)－mcc(qa+qc)｝= 0: (6)
These agree with the joint-profit-maximization of the quasi-vertical integrated firm.
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Figure 4
Now, consider operating each firm independently. The automaker informs the subsidiary parts
supplier of the parts demand curve, nMR, such that
nMR(qa) = {MR(qa)－mac(qa)}/λ.＊15
In Figure 5, this tells us that the parts demand curve will shift to the right from nMR1 to nMR2
if the degree of vertical integration, λincreases.
In Figure 6, for a given value of λ, the parts-supplier initially produces up to the point where
mcc(qa+qc) = nMR (qa) + mr(qc) = Σmr1 at the level of output, OR1. It then sells OM1 to the
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Figure 5
Figure 6
external market at the price, OB1, and sells OG1 to the automaker at the transfer price, OA1 =
mcc(qa+qc). However, the sales OG1 to the automaker occurs where mcc(qa+qc)) = nMR (qa) ≡
｛MR(qa)－mac(qa)｝/λ.
As is shown in Figure 6, it is interesting to compare the solution of the quasi-vertically
integrated firm, λ< 1, with the fully vertically integrated firm, λ= 1. The solution of the latter
case is shown as nMR2. Resulting from the leftward shift of nMR from nMR1 to nMR2 due to the
increase of λ, the Σmr curve will also shift from Σmr1 to Σmr2. Sales to the parent automaker,
OG1 drops toOG2 when λ= 1, but sales to the external rises from OM1 to OM2. The transfer price
will then drop to OA2, while the price to the external market slightly drops to OB2.
To determine the optimal degree of vertical integration, differentiate the firm’s maximum profit
with respect toλ. This yields A′(λ) = rqc－c(qa+qc) ≡πc, where πc is the economic profit of the
parts-supplier and it is independent of the degree of vertical integration, λ. As is shown in Figure
7, the optimal degree of vertical integration, λ* is obtained by finding the intersection of πc and
A′(λ) .＊16
B. Case of Technologically Dependent Parts-supplier:
Similar to the discussion above, but this time, the cost function of producing parts includes the
degree of stock ownership of the parts-supplier by the parent automaker, λ. Because the more
the parent automaker owns its parts-supplier’s stock, the more information to produce parts are
obtained from the parts-supplier. More specifically, under the kigyo keiretsu system, better
communication between the automaker and its parts-suppliers in the group will help the parts-
supplier to reduce its production costs as well as other transaction costs. Thus, it is quite
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Figure 7
plausible that the cost function includes the variable, λ as a cost saving factor due to vertical
integration, and set the cost function as c(qa+qc,λ). As the amount of the automaker’s partial
stockholdings of its parts-supplier increases better coordination between the automaker and its
parts-supplier. Hence, c(qa+qc,λ) is assumed to be a monotonously decreasing function of λ.＊17 To
obtain the optimal degree of vertical integration, λ, differentiate the following equation with
respect to λ.
max p(qa)qa－z(qa) + λ｛r(qc)qc－c(qa+qc, λ)｝－A(λ)  : (8)
λ
The first order condition is obtained as
πc－λc(qa+qc, λ) = A′(λ) : (9)
where πc≡rqc－c(qa+qc, λ), the economic profit of the parts-supplier. The optimal degree of
vertical integration, λ* is finally obtained by solving the equation (9) with respect to λ(See
Figure 8).＊18
In sum, extended Hirshleifer’s models show us how the prices of parts to the parent automaker
and to the external intermediate market, or to the non-kigyo-keiretsu member firms are charged.
Namely, the transfer-price is set lower than the market price. This result gives us an answer to
the question, why the automaker organizes the kigyo keiretsu system. By organizing such a
quasi-vertically integrated form, the parent automaker could purchase a lower price of parts from
its member parts-supplier.
Another result is that the sales amount to the external market, or sales to non-kigyo-keiretsu
member firms will be increased as the degree of vertical integration, ( increases, whereas the
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Figure 8
sales amount to the parent automaker declines. In addition to this result, the more the degree of
vertical integration brought out, the fewer amount of total sales is expected (As is illustrated in
Figure 6, total sales decreases from OR1 to OR2 as the degree of vertical integration, λincreases). 
This result could be apparently a paradox of vertical integration. However, this is the pint
where the full-vertical integration (or fully in-house production of parts) is not dominant in a real
business. Rather, the quasi-vertical organization is often preferred, and is often observed.  
．Hypothesis and Empirical Results
In section , we expect that parts-suppliers’ total sales might decrease as the degree of
vertical integration increases. To empirically test this hypothesis, a simple regression model is
used: 
ln (Total Revenue) = a + bλ+ cλ2 : (10)
where λ is the percentage of stock ownership of parts-supplier by the parent automaker, and the
variable, revenue as a proxy of parts-supplier’s total sales. Expected signs of each coefficient are 
c < 0, and b >0 if the kigyo keiretsu system works as a stable quasi-vertical organization. In other
words, as is shown in Figure 9, the optimal degree of the automaker’s shareholding of their parts-
suppliers should be bounded between zero and one (i .e. , 0 < λ < 1). 
From equation (10), to maximize the parts-supplier’s total sales, the optimal degree of
automaker’s shareholdings to the parts-supplier is estimated as 
λ =－b / (2c): (11).
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Figure 9
Data Sources
The Kaisha Zaimu Karute (i.e., Corporation Financial Report) in 1988 and 2000, the Auto Parts
Industry in Japan, 1988 and The Structure of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry, 6th ed (1997) are
used as the main data sources for this empirical research.＊19 The sample consists of 64 parts-
suppliers in 1987 and 66 parts-suppliers in 1999, including auto-body assemblers, which are joining
kigyo keiretsu groups, and are listed in Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka Stock Exchanges, Section 1
and 2. Note that the sample mainly includes the larger first-tier subcontractors with three
thousand employees on average, since small- and medium-sized firms belong most likely to the
second layer of the core subcontractors.＊20 In this study, my main interest is to analyze
relationship between automakers and primary parts- suppliers, which belong to a kigyo keiretsu
group. 
Descriptive statistics of overall data are summarized in Table 2. The automaker’s shareholdings
to its parts-suppliers on average declined from 1987 to 1999. 
Table 2. Overall Data of Parts-Suppliers Joining a Kigyo Keirestu Group in 1987 and 1999
Note: Standard deviations (SD’s) are shown in (   ); Units are shown in [    ].
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Shareholdings by the
Automaker [%] (λ)
Total Asset (TA) 
[million yen]
Total Revenue (Rev) 
[million yen]
Total Employment 
(TEM)
Ordinary Profit 
over Total Asset
(π/ TA)
Ordinary Profit 
over Total Revenue
(π/ TR)
Sample Size
Min.
.017
9492
6978
176
-.0921
-.0886
Max.
58.06
1556363
1329003
39549
.0965
.0772
Mean
22.73
(14.08)
117538
(206851)
124960
(191125)
3103
(5106)
.0125
(.0324)
.0101
(.0316)
Min.
1.37
5595
8364
198
-.0699
-.0559
Max.
64.27
808293
964762
36109
.1332
.2533
Mean
25.87
(15.42)
68605
(111185)
103866
(144306)
3061
(4687)
.0420
(.0350)
.0420
(.0379)
1987 1990
N＝65 N＝67
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of kigyo keiretsu member firms in 1987 and in 1999. For
the two dominant manufacturers, Toyota and Nissan Motors, stock ownership is very substantial,
whereas for the smaller automakers, Honda, Isuzu, Mazda and Mitsubishi, stock ownership is
substantial but lower than that held by the dominant automakers, Toyota and Nisan. Note that
the Toyota and Nissan’s shareholdings to its parts-suppliers on average declined from 1987 to
1999.
Table 3. Kigyo Keiretsu Member Firms in 1987 and in 1999
Note: The variable, λ is defined as the percent of a supplier’s common stock that is owned by the
primary automaker in a group.
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Sub Classification
Variables
Shareholdings in 1987 [%]  (λ)  
Total Revenue (TR) 
[million yen]
Ordinary Profit over Total Asset in 1987
(π/ TA)
Ordinary Profit over Total Revenue in
1987  (π/ TR)
Sample size in 1987
Shareholdings in 1999 (λ99)
Total Revenue (TR)
[million yen]
Ordinary Profit over Total Asset in 1999
(π/ TA)
Ordinary Profit over Total Revenue in
1999  (π/ TR)
Sample size in 1999
Toyota & Nissan Groups
29.40
(14.17)
117610
(159532)
.0460
(.0358)
.0279
(.0246)
50
25.87
(12.74)
141969
(214647)
.0141
(.0285)
.0123
(.0277)
51
Other Auto Groups
14.09
(13.82)
58052
(56537)
.0290
(.0297)
.0374
(.0659)
15
12.71
(13.80)
70744
(55058)
.0076
(.00433)
.0028
(.0419)
16
Kigyo Keiretsu Member Firms
Table 4 and Table 5 present the results of five regressions of equation (10). Note that the
statistical software, SPSS, version 11.5J is used to obtain the results.
Table 4. OLS Estimation of Equation (10) : All Kigyo Keiretsu Parts-Suppliers
Dependent Variable: ln (Total Revenue)
Note: Numbers in (   ) indicates the standard error. * indicates significance at the 10 % level. 
** indicates significance at the 5 % level. *** indicates significance at the 1 % level.
In Table 4, the parameter estimates are generally consistent with the hypothesis developed
from the model; that is, c < 0, and b >0. From equation (11), the optimal degree of shareholdings
by the automaker is estimated as 31.38 % in 1987, and 35.25 in 1999, respectively. In other words,
total sales of parts-suppliers in a kigyo keiretsu group become maximum when λ = 31.18 in 1987,
and 35.25 in 1999, respectively. Note that somewhat lower adjusted R2 values in both years are
due to missing explanatory variables. In 1987 and 1999, F-values are 3.296 and 2.536, respectively.
These values suggest that the null-hypothesis H0: b = c = 0 is rejected at the 5 % in the case of
1987, and it is also rejected at the 10% levels of significance in the case of 1999. In sum, these
results support the hypothesis that the kigyo keiretsu system works as a stable quasi-vertical
organization.
Note that by using the Chow test (Gujarati, 2003: 275-279) in estimating equations (10), we fail to
reject the structural changes between these two periods (i.e., 1987 and 1999) at the 5 % level of
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a
b
c
Adjusted R2
F-value
Sample Size
Optimal Degree of Shareholdings
by the Automaker: λ=-b/(2c)
1987
17.060***
(.349)
6.961**
(2.740)
- 11.164**
(4.861)
.067
3.296
65
31.18 [%]
1999
10.422***
(.341)
5.441*
(3.126)
-7.717
(6.244)
.044
2.536
67
35.25 [%]
significance, nevertheless the Japanese subcontracting system is reported to be changed after the
mid-90s (Fujiki, 2002). This is an interesting result. 
Table 5. OLS Estimation of Equation (10) : Toyota and Nissan Kigyo Keiretsu Group Parts-Suppliers
Dependent Variable: ln (Total Revenue)
Note: Numbers in (   ) indicates the standard error. * indicates significance at the 10 % level. 
** indicates significance at the 5 % level. *** indicates significance at the 1 % level.
In Table 5, the parameter estimates are generally consistent with the hypothesis developed
from the model; that is, c < 0, and b >0. This result seems to support the hypothesis that the
kigyo keiretsu system, more specifically, Toyota or Nissan kigyo keiretsu system keeps a stable
quasi-vertical organization. From equation (11), the optimal degree of either Toyota’s or Nissan’s
shareholdings to their parts-suppliers is estimated as 31.77 % in 1987, and 34.11 in 1999,
respectively. In other words, total sales of parts-suppliers’ in either Toyota’s or Nissan’s kigyo
keiretsu group become maximum when λ = 31.77 % in 1987, and 34.11 % in 1999. Note that
somewhat lower adjusted R2 values in both years are due to missing explanatory variables. In
1987 and 1999 F-values are respectively 2.477 and 1.541. These values suggest that the null-
hypothesis H0: b = c = 0 is rejected at the 10 % in 1987, while it fails to reject the null hypothesis
at the 10% levels of significance in 1999. In a sense, these results weakly support the hypothesis
that the either Toyota’s or Nissan’s kigyo keiretsu system works as a stable quasi-vertical
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a
b
c
Adjusted R2
F-value
Sample Size
Optimal Degree of Shareholdings
by the Automaker: λ=-b/(2c)
1987
16.938***
(.542)
8.129**
(3.671)
- 12.792**
(- 1.013)
.057
2.477
65
31.77 [%]
1999
10.293***
(.542)
6.601
(4.213)
-9.675
(7.652)
.021
1.541
67
34.11 [%]
organization.
Note that by using the Chow test (Gujarati, 2003: 275-279) in estimating equations (10), we fail to
reject the structural changes between these two periods (i.e., 1987 and 1999) at the 5 % level of
significance, nevertheless the Japanese subcontracting system is reported to be changed after the
mid-90s (Fujiki, 2002). This is an interesting result. 
．Conclusion
First of all, this transfer-pricing model shows us how the prices of parts to the parent
automaker and to the external intermediate market (i.e., the non-keiretsu member firms) are
charged. Namely, the transfer-price is set lower than the market price. This gives us the answer
the question why the automaker (i.e., final assembler) has an incentive to organize the quasi-
vertical organization, so-called, “kigyo keiretsu” system-the automaker could purchase a lower
price of parts from its member parts-suppliers. Another result from the model analysis is that the
sales amount to the external market will be increased as the degree of the automaker’s
stockholdings of its parts-suppliers increase, while the sales to the parent automaker are declined.
This result is somewhat surprising: the more the degree of vertical integration is brought out, the
fewer amounts of the total sales is expected (ie., sales decrease from OR1 to OR2 in Figure 6).
However, this is the point where the fully vertical integration is not dominant. Rather, the
automaker’s partial stockholdings of its parts-suppliers or quasi-vertically integrated organization,
so-called kigyo keiretsu organization is observed in the real business.    
If the quasi-vertically integrated organization takes place in the Japanese automobile
manufacturing industry, then one may ask the question of whether the quasi-vertical organization
is stable. If so, is there any optimal degree of the automaker’s shareholdings to its parts-suppliers
to maximize the parts-supplier’s total sales. In our simple regression analyses, we obtain the
correct signs of coefficients in equation (10). More specifically, the kigyo keiretsu system works as
a stable quasi-vertical organization, and the optimal degree of the automaker’s shareholding of
their parts-suppliers should be bounded between zero and one (i.e., 0 < λ < 1). Furthermore, the
optimal degree of automaker’s shareholdings is 31.18 % in 1987 and 35.25 % in 1999, respectively.
In the case of Toyota and Nissan parts-suppliers, the optimal degree of automaker’s shareholdings
is 31.77 % in 1987, and 34.11 % in 1999, respectively. In the case of 1997, it is interesting to note
that the automaker could possess the power of veto in its parts-supplier’s board of director’s
meeting if the optimal degree of shareholdings is greater than 25 %. Furthermore, the automaker
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could practically control the board of directors if it owns more than 33.3 % (or holding 1 / 3 of
total shares) of the parts-supplier’s shares, since 2 / 3 of votes are required to change any rules in
the board meeting. Thus, it is plausible that the optimal degree of shareholdings is somewhere
between 25 % and 34 %.
REFERENCES 
Aoki, M. 1984. Aspects of the Japanese firm in “The Economic Analysis of the   Japanese Firm”
(M. Aoki, Ed.), 3-43, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Aoki, M. 1986. Horizontal vs. vertical information structure of the firm, American Econ. Rev., 76,
971-983.
Aoki, M. 1987. “The Japanese Firm in Transition,” 469－515, in Y. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba, eds.,
The Political Economy of Japan. CA: Stanford University Press.
Asanuma, B. 1992. Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationships in international perspective: the
automobile case in “International adjustment and the Japanese Firm,” (P. Sheard Ed.), Allen &
Unwin Pty Ltd, Australia.
Auto Trade Journal-sha, ed. 1987. Nihon No Jidosha Buhin Kogyo [English translation: the Auto
Parts Industry Yearbook]. Tokyo: Auto Trade Journal Sha. 
Blois, K. J. Journal of Industrial Economics, 20, 253-272.
Cusumano, M.A. 1985. The Japanese Automobile Industry: Technology and Management at
Nissan and Toyota, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Dodwell Marketing Consultants 1986. “Industrial Groupings in Japan,” Dodwell Marketing
Consultants, Tokyo.
Dodwell Marketing Consultants 1997. “The Structure of the Japanese Auto Parts Industry, 6th ed.,”
Dodwell Marketing Consultants, Tokyo.
Fair Trade Commission 1993. “Jidosha Buhin No Torihiki Ni Kansuru Jittai Chosa,” Fair Trade
Commission, Tokyo. [English translation: Survey of auto-parts tradings in the Japanese
automobile industry.] 
Fujiki, K. 2002. Kawaru Jidosha Buhin Torihiki: Keiretsu Kaitai [English translation: Changing
Auto Parts Business: Break-up Keiretsu System], Economisuto Sha, Publications, Inc.
Hershleifer, J. 1956. “On the Economics of Transfer Pricing,” Journal of Business, 172－184.
Inaba, F.S., and Tabeta, N. 1995. “The kigyo keiretsu Arrangements and Opportunism in the
Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Industry,” NTU SABRE, Working Paper Series,
75
An Application of Extended Transfer-pricing Model to the Kigyo Keiretsu System 
in the Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Industry
Singapore. 
IRC. 1987. “Jidosha Buhin 160 Hinmoku No Seisan Ryutsu Chosa,” [English translation: Survey of
Product Distributions of 160 Auto Parts.], IRC, Inc., Nagoya.
Itami, H. 1988. Mieru Teniyoru Kyoso [Competition by Visible Hand] in “Kyoso to Kakushin:
Jidosha Sangyo No Kigyo Seicho,” (H. Itami and Itoh, M., et al. Eds.), Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha,
Tokyo. [English translation: Competition and Innovation: Corporate Growth of the Japanese
Automobile Industry.] 
Kobayashi, H., and Ohno, H., 2005. Gurobaru Kaikaku Ni Muketa Nihonn No Jidosha Buhin
Sanngyo [English translation: The Japanese Auto Parts Industry toward Global Changes],
Kogyo Chosakai, Tokyo.
Ministry of Finance, ed. 1987. Yuka Shoken Hokokusho Soran [English translation: Annual
Corporation Reports (Various Companies)]. Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Press.
Monteverde, K., and Teece, D. J. 1982. Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration, Bell
Journal of Economics, 13, 206－213.
Nakatani, I. 1984. The economic role of financial corporate grouping in “The Economic Analysis of
the Japanese Firm” (M. Aoki, Ed.), 227－258, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Shimokawa, K. 1985. “Japan’s Keiretsu System: The Case of the Automobile Industry,” Japanese
Economic Studies, 13, 3－31.
Tabeta, N. 1991. “A Model of Quasi-vertical Integration in the Japanese Automobile Industry:
Consideration of technological Efficiency vs. X-inefficiency,” The Takachiho Ronso, 26, No.2,
27－46. 
Tabeta, N. 1998. “The kigyo keiretsu Organization and Opportunism in the Japanese Automobile
Manufacturing Industry,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 15, No.1, 1－18. 
Tabeta, N., and Rahman, S. 1999. “Risk Sharing Mechanism in Japan’s Auto Industry: the Keiretsu
vs. Independent Parts suppliers,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 16, No.3, 311－330. 
Tabeta, N. 2004. “Reexamination of the kigyo keiretsu Organization and Opportunism in the
Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Industry in 1987 and in 1999,” Seikeironso, Dept. of
Economics and Political Science, Kokushikan University. 
Tabeta, N. 2003. “The kigyo keiretsu Organization and Supplier-Switching-Costs Hypothesis
Testing in the Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Industry in 1987 and in 1999,” Bulletin of
Economic Studies, 15, No.1, 19－41, Institute of Economic Studies, Kokushikan University. 
Tabeta, N. 2004. “Re-examination of the kigyo keiretsu Organization and Supplier-Switching-Costs
Hypothesis Testing in the Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Industry in 1999,” Bulletin of
Naoki Tabeta
76
Economic Studies, 16, No.1, 59－82, Institute of Economic Studies, Kokushikan University. 
Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, ed. 1987. Kigyo Keiretsu Soran [English translation: Survey of Corporate
Groups]. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha.
Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, ed. 2000. “Kigyo Keiretsu Soran,” Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha,
Tokyo. [English translation: Survey of Corporate Groups.]
Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, ed. 1988. Kaisha Zaimu Karute [English translation: Analysis of Corporate
Finance], Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, Tokyo. 
Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, ed. 2000. Kaisha Zaimu Karute [English translation: Analysis of Corporate
Finance], Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, Tokyo. 
Yamamura, K., and Yasuba, Y., eds.1987. The Political Economy of Japan, Stanford University
Press, Palo Alto, CA.
Williamson, O. E.1975. Markets and Hierarchies, Mcmillan Publishing Co., Inc. New York, NY.
＊1 It is my great honor to be published in the first issue of this journal, and this paper is dedicated to the late
professor, Keiji Kasuya, who closed his seventy years of life two years ago―he contributed a lot of establishing
School of Asia 21, and the Asia-Japan Research Center.     
＊2 On the Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Industry, refer to Cusmano (1985) for detailed illustration. 
＊3 “Vertically” integrated manufacturing groups, so-called “kigyo keirestu” groups are to be distinguished from
“horizontally” integrated financial groups, so-called “kigyo shudan,” which consist of firms surrounding a major
financial company. For further descriptions of corporate groups, see Aoki (1987), Nakatani (1984), Shimokawa
(1985), Fujiki (2002) and Kobayashi and Ohno (2005).
＊4 They are now called Kyohokai.
＊5 Takarakai and Shohokai become Nisshokai, now. Mitsubishi Motors also organizes Kyoryokukai. 
＊6 Manufacturing groups or kigyo keiretsu groups are distinguished from financial groups, which consist of firms
surrounding a major financial company; for example, “ex-zaibatsu” groups such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo
and Yasuda. In general, the Japanese term, “keirestu (noun),” simply refer to a “hierarchical” grouping of firms,
“keiretsu-ka” is an adjective form of “keiretsu.” However, in a narrow definition, “keiretsu” refer to these ex-
zaibatsu groups, or financial groups. Thus, to avoid semantic confusion, some Japanese economists use the term,
“kigyo shudan” for these six ex-zaibatsu groups. In contrast, the term, “kigyo grupu (group)” is used for
manufacturing (i.e., non-financial”) groups. See K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba, eds. (1987), The Political Economy in
Japan, and M. Aoki, ed. (1984), The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm. In this paper, the author uses the
“kigyo keiretsu” and “kigyo group” interchangeably for such vertically integrated Japanese manufacturing group. 
＊7 In our sample, only a few parts-suppliers, such as Toyota Boshoku, and Denso, held shares of their parent
automaker’s common stock. In fact, Toyoda Boshoku was a former parent firm of Toyota Motors before the
World War .  
＊8 On supplier-switching-costs and vertical integration in the automobile manufacturing industry, refer to K.
Monteverde, and D. J. Teece (1982), N. Tabeta (2003, 2004).
＊9 Refer to O. Williamson (1975).
77
An Application of Extended Transfer-pricing Model to the Kigyo Keiretsu System 
in the Japanese Automobile Manufacturing Industry
＊10 In the usual definition of vertical integration, a manufacturer fully owns a production process or a capital good
and retains control over the production process or the capital good to initially produce a final good. All quasi-
rents are retained by the manufacturer. On the other hand, quasi-vertical integration means that the
monopolist retains ownership of a production process or a capital good and then contracts with other firms to
use this process or the capital good. Quasi-vertical integration gives up control of the production process of
producing parts and leases it out via a contract to external firms which produce the parts for the down stream
final assembler. See Blois (1972) on vertical quasi-integration.
＊11 From opportunistic point of view, see Inaba and Tabeta (1995), Tabeta (1998), and Tabeta (2004). From risk-
sharing point of view, see Tabeta and Rahaman (1999).
＊12 On Hirshleifer’s original transfer pricing model, refer to “On the Economics of Transfer Pricing,” Journal of
Business, pp.172-184, July 1956.  
＊13 In other words, λ is the degree of parent ownership of the subsidiary parts supplier, used as an index for
measuring the degree of vertical integration? 0<λ< 1 simply means less than full ownership and control, so
that subcontracting is required.
＊14 Note that A(λ) is regarded as a sort of quasi-fixed cost.
＊15 Note that the parts demand curve is obtained from equation (5): 
nMR(qa)≡｛MR(qa)－mac(qa)｝/λ= mcc.
＊16 Note that this result is consistent with the one that I discussed in my article, Tabeta (1991).  
＊17 It is possible to combine the cost function, c(qa+qc, λ) and the administrative cost function., A(λ).
Let the combined cost function of producing parts as θ(qa+qc, λ). Then θ(qa+qc, λ) could be a quadratic
function of λ. However, in this paper, I conceptually separate these two cost curves to make a clear argument.
＊18 Note that this result is also consistent with the one that I discussed in my article, Tabeta (1991).  
＊19 We also refer to Ministry of Finance, ed. (1987), Yuka Shoken Hokokusho Soran [English translation: Annual
Corporation Reports (Various Companies)], and Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, ed. (1987and 2000), kigyo keiretsu
Soran [English translation: Survey of Corporate Groups].
＊20 In fact, data are not available for these small parts-companies.
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